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-IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE ()F UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Respandent,
vs.

S'l'E\V ART B. MACKEY, a single
man, PAUL H. SHERRITT and
JOY D. SHERRITT, his wife; ERNEST E. GURR and GWENDOLYN
GURR, his wife,
Defendants-Appellants.

Case No.
11916

Brief of Plaintiff and Respondent

OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial
court on a non-jury trial awarding to defendants-appellants the amount of $4990.00 for land taken in a
condemnation proceeding.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court correctly ascertained and award a
damages in the amount of $4990.00.
e

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the lower
court vacated and the case to be remanded for a new
trial to determine the damages.

S'fATE}lENT OF FACTS
Respondent, State of Utah, by and through iti
Road Commission, agrees with the statement of facts
as contained in the brief of the appellants, with the
following additional facts and exceptions.
The critical period of concern in this appeal and
for which period of time appellants claim to have been
damaged is between October, 1967 and Sepetmber,
1969, a two year period during which the State of Utah
was engaged in the construction and improvement of
the highway adjacent to appellants' property. Thr
State of Utah undertook such construction in order
to improve traffic conditions, facilitate traffic flow .and
minimize the hazards involved in traveling on the high·
way in question.
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Appellants base their claim for losses upon the fact
that a passing motorist did not have direct access to
the subdivision and therefore there were no sales made
through that method. But appellants' own witness, and
incidentally one of the promoters of this business venture, testified that for selling purposes " ... primarily,
we depended upon the Salt Lake Realty to bring in the
customers in whichever way they felt was best suitable
to them." (Record, P. 64).
No competent evidence was introduced at trial to
show that the sales office located on the Faure property,
abutting the highway, was transacting land sales to any
extent in order to substantiate appellants' claims for
damages. On the contrary, one witness, the project
engineer for highway construction who had spend much
time around the sales office, testified that there was not
any activity in the area around the sales office. (Record,
P. 141). In addition, the record is devoid of any claims
that the sales office was manned with personnel ready
to serve a passing motorist who might have exhibited
an interest in buying land in the subdivision. In view
of the above the trial court ruled properly, in assessing
appellants' damage as being most speculative; the trial
court listened to the testimony offered by both parties,
physically inspected the property in question and ruled
that under the circumstances the claimed damages were
too speculative in nature, and furthermore, in view of
the evidence the trial court had certain reservations as
to whether or not appellants could show any damage
at all.
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Appellants did not make diligent efforts to obtain
temporary access to their subdivision in that they only
attempted to contact the project engineer once and
because they were successful abandoned their efforts.
The record clearly indicates (Record, P. 142) that
temporary access was available; all one had to do was
to make an effort to contact the person responsible, in
this case the project engineer.
But even assuming that the principals of this ven·
ture could not obtain an access through their own
efforts and the press of other business had called them
out of the State of Utah, they had agents, i.e., their
own project engineer and the real estate agency re·
sponsible for the sale of the lots; these agents were
familiar with the real estate industry and the construction of highways and could have been instructed by
appellants to seek a temporary access to their land development. But this appellants had failed to do either
because of simple neglect or because that access was
not as vital at that time as they wish it to be in retro·
spect. The testimony is clear, unequivocal and sup·
ported by prior practice, that temporary access to the
development was available and ready to be given to
anyone who needed it. That was in addition to the other
access on Highway 40 which was not affected by the
construction.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD
THAT THE STATE'S USE OF REGULATORY
DEVICES IN CLOSING TEMPORARILY APPELLANT'S ACCESS IS NOT COMPENSABLE.
The facts of this case demonstrate the classic
example of temporary restriction of access which results
from a number of construction activities of governmental units. It is this area in which the equities most
highly and most often favor the "condemnor." Highway construction, with few exceptions may restrict
someone's access. Generally, the rule of law has been
that for the court to a ward damages it must be shown
that a permanent loss of access has occurred and no
substitute access is available. Appellant failed to produce competent evidence at the trial in order to show
that a permanent loss of access has occurred.
In the instant case none of the appellants' property
was actually appropriated or used for purposes of the
highway construction and the appellants base their
claim for damages upon interference with the access
to the property. It has long been the rule in this State
that consequential damages may not be recovered by
an abutting property owner for the diminution in value
of his property because the State interferes with the
access to his land or diverts traffic therefrom.
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Damages resulting merely from circuity of access
are considered as dammun absque injuria. In Robinett
v. Price, 74 Utah 512, 208 P. 736 (1929) the Supreme
Court of this State stated that though claimant was
inconvenienced in going to and from his property and
though the value and the rental of his property may
have, as contended by him, been decreased, yet such
inconvenience and injury are not in kind and degree
special, entitling the plaintiff to compensation for resulting loss or injury occasioned thereby. 780 P. 736
at 737.
The principle that abutting owners have no rights
in the convenient accessability of the public to their
place, the loss of which would mean loss of business,
was reiterated in State by State Road Commission v.
Rozelle et u.x., 101 Utah 464, 120 P 2d 276 ( 1941),
and was emphasized therein by a concurring opinion
of Justice Wolfe, who stated that the law does not give
the abutting property owners a vested right in the busines which travel along a public Wghway. Appellants in
the case at bar argue in their brief that the inconvenience of access to reach the Highland Estates Subdivision entitled them to damages which at best are most
speculative.
Other courts have ruled on this point. In the New
York landmark case of Selig v. State, IO N.Y. 2d 34,
176 N.E. 2d 59, 217 N.Y.S. 2d 33 (1961), the property
owner's claim for damages was based upon change of
grade and interference with the access, light and air to
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the property. The court rejected the claimant's right
to compensation and "implicit in this holding is the
Court's acceptance of the 'suitabilty' of the access provided by the service road not withstanding the obvious
diminution both qualitatively and quantitatively of
access resulting from the substitution of the one way
service road for the prior unlimited access on a main
thoroughfare." Richard S. Mayberry and Frank A.
Aloi, Eminent Domain in New York, 16 Buffalo L.
Rev. 603 at 613.
Appellants appear to rely on the case of State of
Arizona vs. Thelberg, 87 Ariz. 318, 350 P. 2d 918
(1960); but that reliance is misplaced in that the
Arizona case is clearly distinguishable on its facts.
There, damages were awarded as compensation for severance damages which is not what is claimed in the
instant case, and furthermore, the Arizona case is not
one which merely involved temporary loss of access
but rather a permanent loss of access because of grade
changes in the property taken. In the Thelberg case
the facts show that the grade in front of the owner;s
property was raised approximately 20 feet from its
previous level. State v. Thelberg, 350 P 2d 988 at 990.
Respondent contends here that since there was not a
"change of grade" and appellants' property was not
cut off from all means of ingress and egress, there is
not common law liability of the state to the owner and
therefore no recovery should be allowed. Respondent
agrees that the rule has been that whenever a permanent
loss of access occurs due to a change of grade injuries
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resulting from such governmental acts are compensable
in almost all jurisdictions. But this is not what the
facts of the instant case show. In response to a question
by the State's attorney on cross examination appellants'
witness, .Mr. Alsop, an expert engineer, admitted that
there was another access to the appellants' property.
(Record 33) . Therefore, appellants cannot claim that
a permanent loss of access occurred by the mere fact
that another access was available to him but it was ,
not used simply because it was inconvenient. This
court cannot order the expenditure of public monies
in order to reimburse a businessman, involved in real
transactions, for loss of access which may be desirable
because of the business advantages it may provide.
The trial judge who heard all the witnesses, saw
all the evidence, and in addition made a physical inspec- '
tion of the premises carefully weighing all the offered
testimony concluded that appellants did not suffer
any sustantial damages and awarded damages according to the evidence presented.
The facts of this case prove conclusively and are
admitted by appellants in their brief that they seek
damages because of inconvenience; the rule has long
been that although the abutting owner may be inconvenienced by a regulation, if it is reasonably adapted
to benefit the traveling public, he has no remedy unless
given one by express statute. The record is replete with
testimony by the project engineer of the State, responsible for the construction activities of the State adjacent
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to appellants' property, that had appellants desired an
additional access in order to be aided in their business
enterprises, all they had to do is contact him to get
an extra access. (Record 145). Appellants claim to
have made some attempts to acquire access but were
unsuccessful and so they decided to leave the State
of Utah and vacation in Arizona and California. Nevertheless, appellants by their own admissions had agents
in this State, who if instructed that the access was so
vital to this business enterprise, could have made some
diligent efforts to try and locate the responsible people
who could have given them an answer. But this appellants have failed to do; and now they are asking this
court to reimburse them for their speculative business
losses which were due to lack of business foresight and
plain common sense.
Appellants base their losses upon the fact that it
was difficult for a passing motorist to accept the invitation offered through a sign, to enter the subdivision,
contact the sales office and discuss the possible purchase of a lot. However, appellant lVIackey
that in selling the lots since the year 1964, three years
prior to the alleged closing of the access, that the main
selling technique used was the utilization of a real
estate agency in order to acquaint prospective customers
with the area. Their reliance for selling upon the passing motorist was so nil that they did not choose to have
their sales office manned in order to meet the anticipated
demand.
9

The trial court correctly did not view the closure
of the access as an impairment which had destroyed
value of appellants' property for two years. Whatever
losses appellants claim to have sustained as a result of
the new construction of the highway can only be at·
tributed and must be absorbed as a business risk in a
business venture. Appellants c31Unot seek redress
through the court system in asking the State to subsidize their business venture with public monies and
thus be rescued from an unsound business decision.

CONCLUSION
The alleged damages that appellants claim to have
sustained as a result of the temporary closing of one
access to the Highland Estates subdivision were prop·
erly ascertained by the trial court as a business risk
inherent in subdivision development, a loss-which if
even provable and non speculative-is not compensable
under the laws of the State of Utah. The mere dis·
turbance of the rights of access of abutting owners on '
a highway by the imposition of temporary closure must
be tolerated by them and such activities of the State
which may have adversely affected the commercial value
of the land are not compensable.
1

But even assuming that the losses claimed by ap·
pellants are correct, the record clearly indicates that
they sustained such losses because of their own lack
of diligent efforts to obtain temporary access. The
10

burden is on appellants as businessmen engaged in an
expensive business venture to safeguard their investment and minimize their possible losses. They cannot
stand moot at the time the fences were being constructed
and then after all was completed ask the courts of this
State to expend public monies so that they might be
extricated from a difficult financial position.
The trial court concluded that appellants' investment was not lost or depreciated; their values are in
the development and are ready to be harvested as soon
as they get their promotion program going again.
The questions raised by appellants' brief are all
questions of fact which were determined properly at
the trial court level.
We respectfully submit that the Supreme Court of
this State should not substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court in questions of fact as presented by
appellants.
Respectfully submitted,
CARL J. NEMELKA
315 East 2nd South

Suite 404 El Paso Gas Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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